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RECONSIDERING INDIRECT-PURCHASER CLASS ACTIONS 
Stephen Carr* 
Abstract 
Few issues have proven more vexing to private antitrust enforcement 
than those related to indirect-purchaser class actions. The current dual 
system of enforcement—federal and state—exacerbates the difficulty of 
litigating indirect-purchaser claims by layering procedural complexity 
on top of substantive complexity and by explicitly allowing (perhaps 
even incentivizing) duplicative recovery. Almost all commentators are 
in substantial agreement that reform is necessary, but Congress appears 
unlikely to take action on the issue in the near future. This Note 
proposes a procedural solution that would consolidate litigation in a 
single federal court based on the limited-fund class action model of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B). Under the limited-fund 
model, the purpose of consolidated litigation is to determine liability 
before turning to the apportionment of damages. This Note also 
advocates for a presumption that damages are appropriately allocated to 
purchasers on a pro rata basis, consistent with common practice in the 
limited-fund class action context. Proper allocation would depend on 
the purchaser’s position in the supply chain, with direct purchasers 
receiving the largest share of the recovery. This Note’s proposal 
provides three primary advantages: (1) it eliminates the possibility of 
duplicative litigation; (2) it aligns the interests of all the potential 
plaintiffs to better incentivize vigorous antitrust enforcement; and (3) it 
reduces the need for complex damages calculations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We are all victims of antitrust violations—the goods and services 
that we purchase every day are more expensive than they would 
otherwise be in the absence of anticompetitive conduct.1 Even 
consumers who never purchase products directly from price-fixing 
companies or illegal monopolies have paid supracompetitive prices, 
either for goods whose prices were manipulated higher up the supply 
chain, or through increased prices of component parts or ingredients.2 
For decades, antitrust scholars, lawmakers, and judges have been 
divided over the wisdom of providing indirect purchasers standing to 
assert claims under the antitrust laws versus reserving the exclusive 
right to sue for direct purchasers.3 While current federal law prohibits 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 17–20 (2005). 
Anticompetitive conduct can refer to a wide variety of practices, from large cartels joining 
together to fix prices to single firms abusing their monopoly power.  
 2. For an economic analysis of the extent to which price fixing harms purchasers beyond 
merely increasing prices for units purchased, see Leonardo J. Basso & Thomas W. Ross, 
Measuring the True Harm from Price-Fixing to Both Direct and Indirect Purchasers, 58 J. 
INDUST. ECON. 895, 897 (2010). 
 3. For an early scholarly debate in the aftermath of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 
720 (1977), compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers 
Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois 
Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1979) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Indirect Purchaser 
Standing], and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A 
2
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indirect-purchaser suits, state law in many jurisdictions, which 
otherwise closely mirrors federal law, grants indirect purchasers 
standing; alternatively, indirect purchasers may bring claims under other 
provisions of their state’s consumer protection laws or under theories of 
unjust enrichment.4  
Nearly all commentators agree that the current private enforcement 
regime—allowing indirect-purchaser suits in certain states but not 
others and sometimes in federal court though never under federal law—
is overly complex and needlessly duplicative.5 In 2007, the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission, a committee of twelve antitrust experts 
established by Congress “to examine whether the need exists to 
modernize the antitrust laws and to identify and study related issues,” 
endorsed legislative reform proposals to grant indirect purchasers 
standing under federal law and to consolidate litigation in a single 
forum.6 However, the Commission’s recommendation seems unlikely to 
become law, and it would do little to address the difficulty of 
apportioning damages or clarifying issues of class-action certification.7 
                                                                                                                     
Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274 (1980), with Robert G. Harris & 
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy 
Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979). Direct purchasers are parties who purchase a good 
from the defendant. Indirect purchasers are parties who have purchased a product at some point 
further down the supply chain (e.g., customers at the retail level when those at the 
manufacturing level fixed the prices) or as a component of a larger product (e.g., one component 
part in a finished automobile). For a general overview of the rule of Illinois Brick and the 
various state-level responses, see AM. BAR ASS’N, INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK 
(2007) [hereinafter INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK].  
 4. For more on consumer protection and unjust enrichment theories, see INDIRECT 
PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 48–58. For a comprehensive overview of 
indirect-purchaser actions in every state, including causes of action that are the functional 
equivalent of indirect-purchaser actions, see AM. BAR ASS’N, INDIRECT PURCHASER LAWSUITS: A 
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Eric J. McCarthy, Gregory S. Seador & Charles R. Price eds., 2010).  
 5. See, e.g., William H. Page, Class Interpleader: The Antitrust Modernization 
Commission’s Recommendation to Overrule Illinois Brick, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 725, 725 
(2008) (noting that nearly all informed observers have “concluded that indirect purchaser 
litigation in the United States is unnecessarily costly and does not serve a sensible antitrust 
policy”). The perceived irrationality of enforcement is not a new phenomenon. E.g., HENRY J. 
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 190 (1973) (“If Mars had antitrust laws, a 
visitor from that planet would surely regard the variety of methods we use for enforcing ours as 
beyond rational comprehension.”). For a thorough criticism of the current state of indirect-
purchaser litigation as failing both to adequately compensate victims and to optimally deter 
violations, see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer 
Interest, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 535 (2003).  
 6. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at vi–vii, 1, 
A.65–67 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_ 
report.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 7. For a criticism of the Commission’s proposal to grant indirect purchasers standing, see 
Page, supra note 5. In fairness to the Commission, a proposal addressing issues of procedural 
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This Note suggests a different approach—certifying indirect-purchaser 
class action suits along the lines of limited-fund class action suits 
created by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B)—based on the 
goals of limiting duplicative litigation, encouraging vigorous 
enforcement, and simplifying complex questions of damages 
calculations.8  
Limited-fund class actions resemble the traditional procedural 
devices of joinder and interpleader in that they reduce the possibility of 
wasteful, duplicative litigation, by consolidating litigation in a single 
forum to clarify parties’ rights and obligations.9 In general, limited-fund 
class actions require mandatory participation to avoid free-rider 
problems10 and incentivize optimal investment in private enforcement.11 
The history of class actions, like the history of procedural law generally, 
is rife with examples of courts and commentators adapting an ostensibly 
procedural device to achieve substantive goals.12 Applying the limited-
fund model to indirect-purchaser class actions could provide an 
                                                                                                                     
law would have exceeded its mandate. See INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra 
note 3, at 8–11. 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). In practice, most antitrust plaintiffs bring suit as class 
actions due to the high cost of litigation and the often relatively small harm suffered by 
individual plaintiffs. For example, a 2008 study of forty antitrust private actions found that 
plaintiffs brought all but six suits as class actions. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, 
Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 
901 (2008).   
 9. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:16 (5th ed. 2014) 
(“All claimants interested in the fund in such proceedings must litigate their claims in that 
aggregate proceeding.”). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (permitting class action treatment 
when “prosecuting separate actions . . . would create a risk of . . . adjudications with respect to 
individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the 
other members . . . or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i) (“A person . . . must be joined as a party 
if . . . that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede 
the person’s ability to protect the interest . . . .”), and FED. R. CIV. P. 22(a)(1) (“Persons with 
claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability may be joined as defendants 
and required to interplead.”). 
 10. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.  
 11. For an argument for the advantages of mandatory participation in class actions, see 
David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in REGULATION THROUGH 
LITIGATION 244 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Regulatory Advantage]. For 
the contrasting view, see Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New 
Millennium and the Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177. 
 12. For an interesting history of the modern class action and an argument that the drafters 
of the 1966 amendments, which created the modern version of Rule 23 and the three categories 
of class action, meant to use the procedure to accomplish the substantive goal of facilitating civil 
rights class actions, see David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its 
Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011). For a historical analysis, 
going back to the medieval period, of the ways group litigation has evolved alongside notions of 
individuality and collectivity, see generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP 
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).  
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opportunity for courts and litigators to improve antitrust enforcement 
and mitigate some of the inherent difficulties in litigating actions 
potentially involving thousands of victims who have collectively 
suffered an enormous harm but are individually entitled to relatively 
small damages. 
This Note proceeds in three Parts, the first of which examines the 
development of federal and state law governing antitrust standing for 
direct and indirect purchasers. The second Part discusses the history of 
limited-fund class actions and related practical class-action issues. The 
third Part considers the advantages of limited-fund class action 
treatment in the antitrust context and further explains the rationale for 
using this framework in indirect-purchaser class actions. 
I.  INDIRECT-PURCHASER STANDING 
The question of standing addresses whether the particular plaintiff 
before the court is the correct person to bring suit.13 Federal courts have 
recognized both prudential limits on standing—limits that Congress 
ought to be able to alter or overcome—and constitutional limits based 
on the federal courts’ Article III powers.14 While the Clayton Act, 
which forms the basis for most private actions seeking treble damages 
for violations of antitrust laws, grants a cause of action to “any person” 
injured by such violations,15 the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois16 has limited standing to direct purchasers.17 The 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3 (5th ed. 2007); see also 
INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 29–33 (discussing standing for 
indirect purchasers).  
 14. Article III extends the judicial powers to all cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 2. For a discussion of various prudential limitations on standing, see CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 13, §§ 2.3.4–.3.6. State legislatures and judiciaries should also be able to extend standing 
beyond the prudential limitations created by the federal judiciary, as they have in the context of 
indirect-purchaser lawsuits. In the class action context, courts usually treat the representative 
plaintiff’s standing to sue as an implicit requirement for certification. Linda S. Mullenix, 
Standing and Other Dispositive Motions After Amchem and Ortiz: The Problem of “Logically 
Antecedent” Inquiries, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 703, 705. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).  
 16. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  
 17. Id. at 746–48. Subsequent decisions have recognized technical exceptions to the rule 
from Illinois Brick, such as when direct purchasers conspire with manufacturers, yet the 
narrowness of these exceptions has tended to reinforce the power of the rule. See INDIRECT 
PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 11–25. Recently, the Supreme Court of 
Canada approved standing for indirect purchasers. See Mark Katz & Chantelle Spagnola, Green 
Light for Indirect Purchaser Claims in Canada, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Dec. 17, 2013), https:// 
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/green-light-for-indirect-purchaser-claims-in-canada/. 
Similarly, Japan provides standing for indirect purchasers. See SIMON VANDE WALLE, PRIVATE 
ANTITRUST LITIGATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN 61–62 (2013). The countries in the 
European Union generally grant indirect purchasers standing as well. Id. at 174–75. Both Japan 
and the European Union also generally allow price-fixers to assert a pass-on offense—price-
5
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Court’s rationale rests on a desire to limit the scope of antitrust 
remedies and thus improve antitrust enforcement.18 Most interpreters 
agree, or assume, that the rule from Illinois Brick is merely a prudential 
limitation that Congress or state lawmakers can amend or overrule.19 In 
California v. ARC America Corp.,20 the Court backed away from any 
strict ban on indirect-purchaser standing in federal courts by refusing to 
preempt state-based causes of action for indirect purchasers; instead, it 
held that state courts could adjudicate these claims without undermining 
the purposes of the federal antitrust scheme.21  
The following Sections discuss the history and decision-making 
surrounding indirect-purchaser standing. The difficulties in reconciling 
the Court’s precedents in Illinois Brick and ARC America help explain 
the current confusion in this area and suggest that reform is necessary.22  
A.  A History of Indirect-Purchaser Standing Under Federal Law 
The Court decided Illinois Brick at a time when antitrust policy was 
undergoing an important shift from a progressive ideology, skeptical of 
big business and inclined to see a wide variety of violations, to a more 
business friendly approach driven by neoclassical economic reasoning 
and optimized by the so-called Chicago School of Antitrust.23 The 
Chicago School attempted to move antitrust enforcement away from 
formalistic characterizations of certain per se offenses toward a more 
nuanced, fact-specific analysis.24 This fact-specific inquiry required 
judges to balance competitive harms against cooperative benefits and 
                                                                                                                     
fixers can avoid damages by claiming that the direct purchaser passed on the overcharge to the 
indirect purchasers. Id. at 61, 174. However, opt-out class actions are generally far less common 
in Japan and the European Union than in the United States. Id. at 63, 177.  
 18. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 740–46 (noting evidentiary burdens and reduced incentives for 
direct purchasers to prosecute); see also Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars Episode I: 
Illinois Brick from Inside the Supreme Court, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 553, 554 (2005) 
[hereinafter Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars] (“In short, the Court believed [indirect-purchaser 
standing] would make for bad antitrust remedial policy.”).  
 19. For a discussion of the various federal and state attempts to modify the rule of Illinois 
Brick, see INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 5–8, 26–28. 
 20. 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
 21. For a discussion of Illinois Brick and ARC America, see Ronald W. Davis, Indirect 
Purchaser Litigation: ARC America’s Chickens Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick 
Wall, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (1997). The difficulty in reconciling these two decisions has 
probably contributed to the perception that overruling Illinois Brick may still be a possibility, 
albeit an unlikely one.  
 22. For an enlightening history of the four most important Supreme Court decisions on 
indirect-purchaser standing—the so-called “Illinois Brick quartet” of Hanover Shoe, Illinois 
Brick, ARC America, and UtiliCorp United—from which much of this Part is drawn, see Gavil, 
Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 563–74. 
 23. See id. at 557–63 (noting the larger ideological shifts occurring within the Court and 
within antitrust enforcement driven by “the confluence of many political, historical, and 
intellectual factors”). 
 24. See id. For more on the evolution of antitrust ideology and approaches to the antitrust 
rules, see generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 31–56. 
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was either implicitly or explicitly concerned with limiting potential false 
positives that might chill otherwise economically efficient behavior.25 
The courts often characterized the new mode of analysis as a “rule of 
reason” and tended to focus on concepts of consumer welfare and 
economic efficiency.26  
Given the influence of the Chicago School and its emphasis on 
nuanced standards as opposed to per se rules, it was surprising to see the 
Court adopt a new per se ban on indirect-purchaser standing in Illinois 
Brick.27 However, at the same time that the Court was attempting to 
expand rule-of-reason analysis, it was also seeking to limit the scope of 
the treble damages private right of action.28 Perhaps with this goal in 
mind, the Court saw in Illinois Brick an opportunity to limit the number 
of potential plaintiffs and the range of issues presented when calculating 
damages by denying standing to indirect purchasers, a potentially large 
and litigious group.29  
1.  Illinois Brick and Offensive and Defensive Pass-On 
Prior to Illinois Brick, defendants were more likely than plaintiffs to 
raise the issue of pass-on. Defendants argued that they should not be 
liable for antitrust damages to direct purchasers who had “passed on” 
the overcharge to their customers, the indirect purchasers.30 In Hanover 
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,31 the Court denied the use 
                                                                                                                     
 25. For a discussion of the importance of the Chicago School in establishing a dominant 
role for economics in antitrust law, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at vii–xi (2d ed. 
2001).  
 26. For the difference between the per se and rule-of-reason analyses, see id. at 39.  
 27. See Andrew I. Gavil, Thinking Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal for Reform, 
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 189 (2009) [hereinafter Gavil, Proposal for Reform] (“Foremost, 
Illinois Brick suffers from the same infirmity as all per se rules. It categorically assumes that 
pass on ‘always or almost always’ will be impossible to measure. If that is not the case, the per 
se rule in Illinois Brick will under-deter.”). 
 28. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 554–55; see, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding that to recover treble damages 
under the Clayton Act, the plaintiff “must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendants’ acts unlawful”). Treble damages, while imprecise, are theoretically justified by the 
need to compensate for undetected violations—if violators only paid actual damages, violations 
would have no penalty, and firms could profit from their violations without cost. See Gavil, 
Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 603. 
 29. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732, 734–35 (1977) (arguing that 
concentrating enforcement in a smaller group of potential plaintiffs with fewer evidentiary 
issues will improve enforcement). 
 30. The economics of “pass-on” can be complicated and often depend on the specific 
conditions of the relevant market at the time of price-fixing, including elasticity of demand and 
the amount of competition at the retail level. See, e.g., Fei Deng, John H. Johnson & Gregory K. 
Leonard, Economic Analysis in Indirect Purchaser Class Actions, 26 ANTITRUST 51, 53 (2011). 
 31. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
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of pass-on as a defense.32 The manufacturer defendant argued that the 
direct-purchaser plaintiff, a retailer, had not suffered antitrust injury 
because it had passed on any overcharge to its customers, the indirect 
purchasers.33 Both the district court and the appellate court rejected the 
pass-on defense, and the Supreme Court affirmed.34 The Court noted 
that, as a general principle, even if the direct purchaser can pass on the 
overcharge, either the reduction in demand for its product at the higher 
price or the increased profits it would have gained at the lower price 
will still injure the direct purchaser to some extent.35 The defendant 
argued that, under certain economic conditions, the direct purchaser 
could pass on all of the overcharge and maintain its profits.36 The Court 
reasoned, however, that the complex economic analysis required to 
determine whether such conditions were present, and if they were 
present, how much of the overcharge was actually passed on, was 
beyond the capabilities of the federal courts.37 Additionally, the Court 
worried that if defensive pass-on could defeat recovery for direct 
purchasers, then indirect purchasers would fail to make up the 
difference because they have a much smaller incentive to prosecute 
antitrust violations since courts would limit their damages to the 
relatively small overcharge from a single purchase, a tiny slice of the 
total antitrust injury.38  
Illinois Brick, however, presented the Court with the opposite 
situation—a plaintiff attempting to use pass-on offensively for 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 488. The order in which the Court addressed the cases—first considering 
defensive pass-on in Hanover Shoe before offensive pass-on in Illinois Brick—certainly framed 
the issues for the Justices in a particular way and may have been critical to the holding in Illinois 
Brick:  
I think the plaintiffs-respondents in this case, which they now have lost, are the 
victims of an unhappy chronology. If Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp. had not preceded this case, and were it not “on the books,” I 
am positive that the Court today would be affirming, perhaps unanimously, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. The policy behind the Antitrust Acts and all 
the signs point in that direction, and a conclusion in favor of indirect purchasers 
who could demonstrate injury would almost be compelled. 
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 33. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 487–88. 
 34. Id. at 488. 
 35. Id. at 489–91 (“We hold that the buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises the 
price for his own product. As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes 
from the buyer more than the law allows.”). 
 36. Id. at 491–92; see also Deng, Johnson & Leonard, supra note 30, at 52–54 (explaining 
the textbook model of 100% pass-on and noting the model’s limited real-world value).  
 37. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 492–93 (“A wide range of factors influence a company’s 
pricing policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be 
measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact been 
different . . . , he would have chosen a different price.”).  
 38. Id. at 494. It’s worth noting that the Court decided Hanover Shoe when modern class 
action practice was still in its earliest stages. Marcus, supra note 12, at 660–61. 
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recovery.39 The State of Illinois, acting on behalf of itself and local 
governmental entities, sued Illinois Brick Company for treble damages, 
alleging that the brick manufacturer conspired to increase the price of 
bricks it sold to masons, who passed the overcharge to general 
contractors, who then passed the overcharge to the end consumer of 
bricks—the State of Illinois.40 Therefore, the State of Illinois was two 
levels of distribution removed from the alleged price-fixing.41 The 
district court dismissed the claim on summary judgment because the 
State of Illinois was an indirect purchaser, but the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit reversed.42  
The Supreme Court framed its final decision as a choice between 
three options: (1) overrule Hanover Shoe and allow for offensive and 
defensive use of pass-on; (2) reinforce Hanover Shoe and strictly 
prohibit both offensive and defensive pass-on; or (3) apply Hanover 
Shoe asymmetrically—allow for offensive but not defensive pass-on.43 
The Court chose the second option—a total bar on the use of pass-
on44—in part because the economic evidence required to establish pass-
on to the indirect purchaser would be the same in both offensive and 
defensive pass-on.45 The Court determined that, in both contexts, pass-
on would require complex, detailed analysis regarding how a change in 
a single price input affected the final price.46 This task might be even 
more complicated in the indirect-purchaser context because courts 
would potentially have to apportion damages at more than one level, as 
in Illinois Brick where Illinois was two levels removed from the alleged 
conspiracy.47 The Court did not wish to further complicate the “already 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977).  
 40. Id. at 726–27.  
 41. Id. at 726. Illinois alleged that the total price-fixing conspiracy resulted in a $3 million 
overcharge to the State and local governments. Id. at 727. 
 42. Id. at 727–28. 
 43. Id. at 729–36; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 387–88. Additionally, the Court might 
have characterized the sale as essentially a cost-plus agreement because the State had to pay the 
cost of the bricks, or the Court might have adopted a more nuanced standard and avoided a per 
se rule of standing. See Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 587, 589 (citing five 
options Justice Lewis Powell’s clerk presented to him). 
 44. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 731 (“[T]he reasoning of Hanover Shoe cannot justify unequal 
treatment of plaintiffs and defendants with respect to the permissibility of pass-on arguments.”); 
id. at 736 (“We are left, then, with two alternatives: either we must overrule Hanover 
Shoe . . . , or we must preclude respondents from seeking to recover on their pass-on theory. We 
choose the latter course.”). 
 45. Id. at 732. 
 46. Id. (“However ‘long and complicated’ the proceedings would be when defendants 
sought to prove pass-on, . . . they would be equally so when the same evidence was introduced 
by plaintiffs.”). 
 47. Id. at 732–33 (“The demonstration of how much of the overcharge was passed on by 
the first purchaser must be repeated at each point at which the price-fixed goods changed hands 
before they reached the plaintiff.”). 
9
Carr: Reconsidering Indirect-Purchaser Class Actions
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
922 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
protracted treble-damages proceedings” by adding additional layers of 
analysis.48 
The Court also relied on two additional factors: (1) the need for 
evenhandedness in applying the pass-on theory,49 and (2) the risk of 
multiple liabilities.50 The evenhandedness argument was based on a 
belief that the same rules should apply to defendants seeking to escape 
liability and plaintiffs trying to establish liability.51 In his dissent, 
Justice William Brennan criticized concern for evenhandedness and 
focused on the policies underlying the decision in Hanover Shoe, noting 
the following:  
The interests at stake in “offensive” passing-on cases, 
where the indirect purchasers sue for damages for their 
injuries, are simply not the same as the interests at stake in 
the Hanover Shoe, or “defensive” passing-on situation. 
There is no danger in this case, for example, as there was in 
Hanover Shoe, that the defendant will escape liability and 
frustrate the objectives of the treble-damages action.52 
Additionally, the Court insisted that “allowing offensive but not 
defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk of multiple liability 
for defendants” because federal law allows direct purchasers to sue for 
the entire overcharge.53 If the direct purchaser succeeded in suing for 
the entire overcharge and the indirect purchaser prevailed as well, the 
defendant would pay double the appropriate amount of damages.54  
Finally, the Court maintained that direct-purchaser suits for treble 
damages most effectively enforced antitrust laws.55 The Court reasoned 
that direct purchasers would have the greatest incentive to enforce the 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 732. 
 49. See Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 596–605 (discussing the evolving 
views of the Justices and the importance of evenhandedness and symmetry).  
 50. Id. at 582–85 (discussing Justice Harry Blackmun’s and Justice Powell’s proposed 
options regarding whether to allow offensive pass-on and the possible problems of double 
recovery). 
 51. Id. at 602 & n.284.  
 52. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 730 (majority opinion). 
 54. Id. (“The risk of duplicative recoveries created by unequal application of the Hanover 
Shoe rule is much more substantial than in the more usual situation where the defendant is sued 
in two different lawsuits by plaintiffs asserting conflicting claims to the same fund.”). For a 
legal argument that multiple recoveries never exist in practice, see Robert H. Lande, Why 
Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 329 (2004) [hereinafter 
Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels]. For an economic argument that courts understate overcharge 
damages, see Basso & Ross, supra note 2.  
 55. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 734–35 (“[W]e understand Hanover Shoe as resting on the 
judgment that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full 
recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff 
potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by 
it.”). 
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law, while litigation over the allocation of damages between different 
levels of purchasers within the supply chain would not greatly improve 
enforcement.56 Indirect purchasers would often suffer damages so small 
that “only a small fraction would be likely to come forward to collect 
their damages.”57 Thus, the Court established a per se rule denying 
indirect purchasers standing to sue for treble damages.58 
2.  Reaction to the Rule of Illinois Brick 
While scholars and judges associated with the Chicago School 
approved of the decision in Illinois Brick,59 consumer advocates 
criticized the decision for overcompensating intermediate parties at the 
expense of consumers and for ignoring congressional intent.60 Not long 
before the Court decided Illinois Brick, Congress passed the Hart–
Scott–Robino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976,61 which authorized 
states to bring parens patriae actions on behalf of indirect purchasers in 
their states.62 Although the majority minimized the importance of the 
Hart–Scott–Robino Act by characterizing it as mere procedural 
litigation, it seemed clear to the dissent that Congress passed the Act 
with the belief that indirect purchasers would have standing under the 
antitrust laws.63 The dissent argued that the majority’s treatment of 
congressional intent appeared self-serving.64  
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 746–47 (“[W]e question the extent to which such an attempt [to apportion 
damages between direct and indirect purchasers] would make individual victims whole for 
actual injuries suffered rather than simply depleting the overall recovery in litigation over pass-
on issues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 57. Id. at 747.  
 58. Id. at 728–29, 748. However, the Court did maintain a possible exception for cost-plus 
contracts. Id. at 735–36.  
 59. See Landes & Posner, Indirect Purchaser Standing, supra note 3, at 634–35 
(“[S]ociety will be well-advised to allow some direct purchasers to enjoy windfalls if, as we 
have argued, the direct-purchaser suit is on balance a more effective instrument for enforcing 
the antitrust rule prohibiting price fixing than the indirect-purchaser suit.”); cf. Richard A. 
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 30 (1972) (arguing that the optimal tort 
system should focus on achieving the optimal investment in safety, not on compensating victims 
or eliminating accidents). 
 60. Lopatka & Page, supra note 5, at 539–40 (summarizing criticism of Illinois Brick by 
consumer advocates). For an economic analysis showing how the rule of Illinois Brick can 
actually extend and entrench cartels, see Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra & Jakob 
Rüggeberg, Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion, 39 
RAND J. ECON. 683 (2008). 
 61. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). 
 62. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 733–34 n.14 (discussing the decision in light of the Hart–Scott–
Robino Act). For a recent discussion of parens patriae actions arguing that they share many of 
the same problematic features as class actions, see Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation 
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012). 
 63. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 64. See id. at 764 n.23. 
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Soon after Illinois Brick, states began to pass so-called “Illinois 
Brick repealers”—statutes aimed at repealing the rule of Illinois Brick 
and reinstating indirect-purchaser suits.65 Additionally, some state 
courts interpreted existing antitrust laws as allowing indirect-purchaser 
suits, often despite explicit language stating that federal law should 
guide state courts in interpreting state antitrust laws.66 In California v. 
ARC America Corp.,67 the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether federal antitrust law preempted state repealer statutes68 and 
held that it did not.69 The Court’s holding seemed to undermine the 
rationale of Illinois Brick and embrace a wider view of standing without 
overruling its previous decision.70 The Court stated that the repealer 
statutes were “consistent with the broad purposes of the federal antitrust 
laws: deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the compensation 
of victims of that conduct.”71 
Despite whatever retreat from Illinois Brick might have momentarily 
occurred in ARC America, the Court quickly reaffirmed and extended 
the rule of Illinois Brick in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc.72 In that 
decision, the Court denied standing to indirect purchasers from a 
regulated utility company—a direct-purchaser entity with little incentive 
to sue and a high likelihood of passing on the overcharge to indirect-
purchasers—and instead limited standing to the utility company itself.73 
B.  Indirect-Purchaser Standing: Where Are We Now? 
The Illinois Brick quartet—Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, ARC 
American, and UtiliCorp—thus established a cumbersome and rigid 
enforcement system—only direct purchasers can sue on a federal cause 
of action for the entire overcharge, but indirect purchasers in certain 
jurisdictions can also sue for the amount of overcharge passed on to 
them.74 This system has led to the possibility of duplicative recovery 
and has ensured duplicative litigation.75 Ironically, this rigid dual 
system arose when the substantive law of antitrust began to coalesce 
                                                                                                                     
 65. See Davis, supra note 21, at 391–95 (describing the history of Illinois Brick repealers). 
 66. See id. at 375–79 (detailing states that allowed indirect-purchaser class actions to 
move forward despite the absence of statutes repealing Illinois Brick). 
 67. 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
 68. Id. at 100. 
 69. See id. at 105–06 (holding that state indirect-purchaser suits were not an obstacle to 
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws). 
 70. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 617. 
 71. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 102. 
 72. 497 U.S. 199 (1990). 
 73. Id. at 204. 
 74. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 564–74.  
 75. See Donald I. Baker, Federalism and Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois 
Brick Road, 17 ANTITRUST, no. 1, 2002, at 14, 15 (“That is the great irony of Illinois Brick—
where a conservative decision led to a populist political reaction that has produced duplicative 
litigation and recoveries on a scale that the Supreme Court majority could scarcely have 
imagined in the first place.”). 
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around common, flexible standards based on federal law and 
precedent.76  
Further, in recent years, the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)77 has 
lowered barriers to removing state-law class actions to federal court, 
expanded the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts in these class 
actions, and consequently lessened some of the disparities between state 
and federal antitrust enforcement, often at the expense of indirect 
purchasers.78 CAFA also increased the likelihood that courts will force 
plaintiffs to pursue state antitrust claims in federal court, which has not 
traditionally recognized their injuries.79 State-law claims brought in 
federal court or removed to federal court are eligible for consolidation 
as part of the multidistrict litigation (MDL) procedure.80 Thus, many 
state-law indirect-purchaser claims now end up in federal court 
alongside direct-purchaser class actions.81 Federal courts can 
consolidate such class actions in MDL for pretrial motions and 
discovery, but the transferee court cannot litigate the consolidated 
claims.82 When indirect-purchaser class actions do arrive in federal 
court, the federal courts have been reluctant to certify class actions 
where plaintiffs sought recovery under different state substantive laws83 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars, supra note 18, at 557–63 (describing the shift in 
antitrust enforcement from 1975 to 1990). 
 77. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1453, 1711–15 (2012)). 
 78. CAFA loosens the removal requirements in suits based on diversity of citizenship in 
four ways: (1) any defendant, including an in-state defendant, can remove; (2) any defendant 
can remove even if not all defendants consent to removal; (3) no time limit exists for removal; 
and (4) decisions to remand are reviewable. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 6:15. For a history of 
the larger goals of CAFA and the aims of the Congress that passed it, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., 
The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional 
Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008). 
 79. See Bruce V. Spiva & Johnathan K. Tycko, Indirect Purchaser Litigation on Behalf of 
Consumers After CAFA, 20 ANTITRUST, no. 1, 2005, at 12, 17 (“CAFA should now be read as a 
mandate for federal courts to decide such [multistate] class actions, including indirect purchaser 
class actions. The need to make decisions based on the laws of multiple states should no longer 
be an accepted basis for a federal court to deny certification, if it ever were.”). 
 80. For a discussion of multidistrict litigation of indirect-purchaser suits, see INDIRECT 
PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 211–23. 
 81. Lopatka & Page, supra note 5, at 534–35 (noting that plaintiffs often bring federal and 
state claims side by side). 
 82. See INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 214–17. No similar 
process exists for consolidating indirect-purchaser claims that are not removable. For a 
discussion of strategies attorneys can use to coordinate across districts informally, see Joel M. 
Cohen & Trisha Lawson, Navigating Multistate Indirect Purchaser Lawsuits, 15 ANTITRUST, 
no. 3, 2001, at 29, 31–33. 
 83. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In a multi-
state class action, variations in state law may swamp any common issues and defeat 
predominance.”); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ourts must respect these differences [in state law] rather than apply 
13
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on the theory that such actions would undermine the common issues 
within the class that must predominate to certify a class under 
Rule 23(b)(3).84 However, such arguments against certification may 
lose force once plaintiffs can no longer pursue their claims in state 
court.85 The conflict between expanded jurisdiction over diversity class 
actions in federal court and the increased focus on common questions 
has left the status of indirect-purchaser class actions uncertain.86 
II.  THE LIMITED-FUND APPROACH 
This Note proposes that antitrust class actions should be 
conceptualized and litigated similar to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund 
class actions. Limited-fund class action treatment would be superior for 
three reasons: (1) it would eliminate duplicative litigation by 
consolidating all ongoing and future litigation in a single forum; (2) it 
would improve enforcement by aligning plaintiffs’ incentives to litigate 
at the liability stage and to seek the maximum recovery by creating 
greater unity within the class; and (3) it would simplify damages 
calculations between levels of the supply chain by distributing damages 
according to a pro rata scheme.87 While designing optimal enforcement 
procedures often requires balancing ease of administration and accuracy 
of result,88 this Note argues that limited-fund class actions offer a better 
                                                                                                                     
one state’s law to sales in other states with different rules.”). 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied 
and if . . . the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members . . . .”). 
 85. For examples of both indirect- and direct-purchaser litigation going forward in federal 
court, see generally In re: TFT–LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1179 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that direct and indirect purchasers stated a claim but dismissing 
indirect-purchaser claims under certain state laws), and In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser 
Antitrust Litigation, 903 F. Supp. 2d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that plaintiffs stated claims 
under various state laws but failed to state claims under the Clayton Act). See also Spiva & 
Tycko, supra note 79, at 17 (“Previously, a federal court that denied certification on [the need to 
make decisions under a variety of state laws] could plausibly argue that plaintiffs could take 
their cases to their respective state courts. But a federal court that refuses to certify a class action 
on those grounds now would effectively deny plaintiffs a remedy by denying them any viable 
forum.”). 
 86. See generally D. Jarrett Arp, Be Careful What You Ask for: Unintended Consequences 
and Unfinished Business Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 20 ANTITRUST, no. 1, 2005, at 8 
(outlining the uncertain future of indirect-purchaser class actions). 
 87. A need to establish aggregate liability toward the class of purchasers as a whole will 
always exist. However, the detailed analysis required to establish the precise level of damages 
for individual purchasers—purchasing at different times, places, and different levels of the 
supply chain—requires a great deal of resources but adds little or nothing in terms of deterrence 
to would-be violators. 
 88. See Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels, supra note 54, at 332 (“We probably are better 
off with even a complicated and flawed damages system that at least provides a moderate level 
of deterrence, than with a simpler system that would lead to completely inadequate 
deterrence.”). For a broader perspective of the American political system’s unique reliance on 
private enforcement, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010). 
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balance between these competing priorities. The following Sections 
provide a brief history of limited-fund class actions and a summary of 
the Court’s most important precedent in this area, Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp.,89 which established the guidelines for certifying Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) classes.90  
A.  An Introduction to Limited-Fund Class Actions 
Generally, limited-fund class action treatment requires two separate 
inquiries: one into the existence of liability along with the total amount 
that the defendants can or should pay plaintiffs, and a second into the 
specific amounts of individual claims.91 In the first inquiry, plaintiffs’ 
interests are united as a class, while in the second they are adverse.92 
Before certifying a limited-fund class action, the court must determine 
whether the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a), 
including numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation.93 Therefore, certification under a limited-fund theory 
does not require that courts avoid scrutinizing certification decisions 
                                                                                                                     
 89. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 90. See infra Section II.B. 
 91. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes (suggesting that courts should 
certify “[a] class action by or against representative members to settle the validity of the claims 
as a whole, or in groups, followed by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim and 
proportionate distribution of the fund . . . .”); see, e.g., Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 
978 (2d Cir. 1952) (certifying a class of seventy subscribers to a common stock fund who had 
responded to a class-wide notice and appeared in court to divide a common fund of assets that 
the court had certified at $176,254.24). Class action treatment pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) also 
resembles interpleader under Rule 22 in that it provides a procedure for joining multiple parties 
into one action when litigation moving forward without absent parties may impact their 
interests. See FED. R. CIV. P. 22. 
 92. See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4:16 (giving an overview of Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) class actions). 
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). Generally, the existence of a common limited fund 
satisfies Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement:  
[I]mplicit in a finding that an action satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) 
is a finding that the opposing party treated the class members in a common way 
or that the issues underlying the class members’ claims are so intertwined that 
adjudicating the claims of some would practically impair or bar the claims of 
others (as in the case of a limited fund). 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 3:27. The adequacy of representation also plays an important role 
in the litigation—although courts often address the issue in the context of a Rule 23(e) fairness 
hearing—because a lack of representation for absent parties can defeat certification of a class or 
a settlement when the absent parties’ interests are adverse to the settling parties’ interests, as is 
often the case in a limited-fund class action. See, e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 
982 F.2d 721, 741–43, 745 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing certification because of a lack of 
subclasses for plaintiffs with adverse interests and opining that the same subclasses may not be 
necessary in a (b)(3) class action). 
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and the adequacy of plaintiffs’ theory to establish class-wide liability.  
1.  Unique Features of Limited-Fund Class Actions 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits the court to certify a class action when:  
prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class 
members would create a risk of . . . adjudications with 
respect to individual class members that, as a practical 
matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the individual adjudications or 
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect 
their interests.94 
The Advisory Committee’s notes for this rule suggest that in limited-
fund situations, the court should certify “[a] class action by or against 
representative members to settle the validity of the claims as a whole, or 
in groups, followed by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim 
and proportionate distribution of the fund.”95  
The final distribution of the aggregate fund is often done on a pro 
rata basis to ensure fairness to all plaintiffs.96 Direct- and indirect-
purchaser class actions implicitly share some characteristics with 
limited-fund class actions—plaintiffs are united in seeking recovery but 
divided over what portion of the recovery ought to accrue to each 
plaintiff according to how much of the overcharge the direct purchaser 
passed on to indirect purchasers.97 While actual harm in antitrust actions 
differs from the total overcharge, the Supreme Court has traditionally 
only recognized overcharge damages and has treated direct- and 
indirect-purchaser class actions as a method of apportioning that total 
overcharge.98 
The limited-fund class action seems to require mandatory class 
treatment, denying plaintiffs any right to opt out of the class.99 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B), with FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1) (“A 
person . . . must be joined as a party if . . . that person claims an interest relating to the subject of 
the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a 
practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest . . . .”). 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes. 
 96. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4:16 (“The [limited-fund] class action solves this 
problem [of early claims being dispositive of later claims or impairing or impeding the claims] 
by aggregating the claims together into one case and apportioning the available funds 
proportionately among all the claimants.”). 
 97. Cf. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737–38 (1977) (discussing the possibility of 
mandatory joinder of plaintiffs and the diversity of interests involved). 
 98. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 74 (“The Supreme Court thus assumed, first, that 
the ‘overcharge’ was the proper method of damages for each successive firm in the distribution 
chain; and, second, that measuring damages on down the line would require that the overcharge 
be traced and ‘apportioned’ among different levels of claimants. In most cases both assumptions 
are false.”). 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A)–(B) (requiring notice for classes certified under Rule 
23(b)(3) but stating that “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may 
16
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Mandatory class treatment is necessary for Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class 
actions to avoid the danger of plaintiffs opting out of the class to pursue 
their own claims and thus exhausting the fund.100 Giving plaintiffs the 
ability to opt out would destroy the purpose for certifying the original 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action.101 However, courts have occasionally 
allowed plaintiffs to opt out of mandatory class actions under 
Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2).102 Courts have also required subclasses for 
different groups of plaintiffs whose claims may have a higher value or 
who might otherwise prefer an alternative compensation structure.103 
Additionally, the traditional limited-fund class action is unique in 
that, after establishing liability, all of the plaintiffs’ interests become 
adverse to one another because a larger recovery for one plaintiff means 
a smaller recovery for all other plaintiffs.104 Reconciling the potentially 
adverse interests of plaintiffs is one of the central challenges in 
litigating limited-fund class actions. Plaintiffs who have stronger claims 
(e.g., direct purchasers, purchasers with detailed records, or large-
volume purchasers) can maximize the value of their recovery and limit 
litigation expenses by pursuing individual litigation.105 However, 
plaintiffs with smaller or negative value claims must pursue class action 
treatment without the benefit of the plaintiffs with the strongest 
claims.106 By splitting their efforts, neither the most valuable claims nor 
                                                                                                                     
direct appropriate notice to the class” (emphasis added)). 
 100. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4:16.  
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Richards-Cantave, 588 F.3d 790, 800 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(allowing a Rule 23(b)(2) plaintiff who objected to the settlement to opt out and stating that 
“[t]he right of a class member to opt-out in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions is not obvious on 
the face of the rule; however, the language of Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible to afford district 
courts discretion to grant opt-out rights in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4:1 (“[M]ost circuits permit a court 
overseeing a class action to enable opt-out rights in (b)(1) . . . cases in certain 
circumstances . . . .”). 
 103. For a discussion of the need for subclasses when plaintiffs’ claims have different 
priority, see In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 725, 738–45 (2d Cir. 
1992). For a discussion of the importance of subclasses when dealing with present and future 
claims, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999). 
 104. See, e.g., In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 
2011) (noting that in a limited-fund class action “every award made to one claimant reduces the 
amount of funds available to other claimants until, in the absence of equitable management of 
the fund, some claimants are able to obtain full satisfaction of their claims, while others are left 
with no recovery at all”). In the context of antitrust class actions, however, the conflicts would 
exist mainly between subclasses of direct and indirect purchasers and not between every 
plaintiff.  
 105. A large purchaser with an independently viable claim would likely increase its odds of 
recovery and decrease the costs of litigation by avoiding the expense and uncertainty of class 
actions. 
 106. For a discussion of the importance of mandatory participation in mass tort litigation 
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the more numerous smaller-value claims can take full advantage of the 
economies-of-scale necessary for successful aggregate litigation, and 
duplicative litigation becomes more likely.107  
2.  Challenges of Litigating Limited-Fund Class Actions 
Mandatory participation in a single litigation to establish liability for 
the entire class is a high-stakes proposition.108 Divergent interests 
between groups of plaintiffs—as well as between plaintiffs’ lawyers and 
their clients—create the potential for collusive settlements.109 Thus, 
courts must closely scrutinize any final settlement and provide adequate 
notice to plaintiffs with the opportunity to object to any settlement. 
Limited-fund class actions do not require notice to class members at the 
certification stage, but notice—along with the opportunity to object—is 
essential at the settlement stage to protect the interests of absent parties 
whose recovery the defendant is attempting to limit.110 The court may 
also provide notice before settlement, including notice of specific issues 
germane to the class litigation.111 Additionally, due process may require 
allowing absent plaintiffs to opt out in certain circumstances.112  
                                                                                                                     
and a criticism of opt-out rights as compounding the problem, see David Rosenberg, 
Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
831, 833–35 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action]. But see 
MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 135–37, 157–69 (2009) (emphasizing the importance of litigant 
autonomy and questioning the necessity of mandatory participation). For an analysis of the 
differing approaches to mandatory participation advanced by various scholars, see Mullenix, 
supra note 11, at 188–200. 
 107. See Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action, supra note 106, at 847. This 
explanation oversimplifies the problem somewhat, as some plaintiffs may not wish to sue at all 
for principled reasons. However, this problem seems less profound in the context of antitrust 
class actions where few people would be opposed to recovering damages from most 
anticompetitive practices. 
 108. For a summary of some of the issues, see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION § 22.73, at 421–24 (4th ed. 2004). For a discussion of the potential difficulties 
inherent in litigating mandatory class actions, including conflicts of interest, and possible 
remedies, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1461–65 (1995). 
 109. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 815 
(1997) (“The same mechanism of friendly settlements can be utilized to scuttle a legitimate class 
action in one forum by the rapid certification and settlement of a class action in a different 
forum.”). 
 110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (stating that when a party proposes a settlement, “[t]he court 
must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the 
proposal”). For the role of objectors in class actions, see Edward Brunet, Class Action 
Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403. 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B) (“In conducting an action under this rule, the court may 
issue orders that . . . require—to protect class members and fairly conduct the action—giving 
appropriate notice to some or all class members of: (i) any step in the action; (ii) the proposed 
extent of the judgment; or (iii) the members’ opportunity to signify whether they consider the 
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or to otherwise 
come into the action . . . .”). 
 112. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 9, § 4.25 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence 
18
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The next Section discusses Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,113 one of the 
only Supreme Court decisions dealing with limited-fund class actions. 
That decision set the framework for the responsibilities of federal courts 
when certifying limited-fund class actions.114 
B.  The Ortiz Factors 
The Supreme Court first addressed the requirements to certify a 
limited-fund class action in the context of complex litigation in Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp.115 The case involved the certification of a 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class of litigants previously exposed to the defendant’s 
asbestos products.116 Prior to Ortiz, federal courts had used limited-fund 
class actions in asbestos and other mass tort actions—tort claims 
involving harm to numerous victims, sometimes spanning a wide 
geographic area or extended time period—to try to facilitate the 
settlement of large, complex litigation.117 Nevertheless, the Court had 
expressed skepticism about an expansive use of class action settlements 
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts118 and Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor,119 driven by concern over the potential for collusive 
settlements between plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants as well as other 
potential intra-class conflicts.120  
Ortiz broadly addressed “the conditions for certifying a mandatory 
settlement class on a limited fund theory under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(1)(B).”121 In reversing the decision to certify, the Court 
examined past decisions that informed the drafting of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
and determined that a qualifying limited-fund class action must have 
three characteristics: (1) “a ‘fund’ with a definitely ascertained limit,” 
                                                                                                                     
related to Rule 23(b)(1) class actions and the Due Process Clause). 
 113. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 114. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 108, § 22.73, at 422–23. 
 115. 527 U.S. at 821. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 108, § 22.73, at 421 (providing 
examples of courts certifying limited-fund class actions in mass torts). For an overview of 
several high profile mass tort proceedings, as well as a critique of and suggestions for improving 
mass tort class actions, see Coffee, Jr., supra note 108, and Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a 
Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 
2045 (2000). For a thorough overview and comparison of mass tort litigation as class actions and 
in bankruptcy, see S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT 
LIMITED FUND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS & BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS (2000). For 
specific information on asbestos litigation, see STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS 
LITIGATION, at xxvii fig.S.1 (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf.  
 118. See 472 U.S. 797, 810–12 (1985). 
 119. See 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997). 
 120. See, e.g., id. at 621 (citing Coffee, Jr., supra note 108, at 1379–80).  
 121. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821.  
19
Carr: Reconsidering Indirect-Purchaser Class Actions
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
932 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
(2) “all of which would be distributed to satisfy all those with liquidated 
claims based on a common theory of liability,” (3) “by an equitable, pro 
rata distribution.”122 The Court refused to certify the class because the 
lower court did not create subclasses for plaintiffs with different 
interests123 and because Fibreboard was able to retain most of its 
value.124 The Court noted that previous limited-fund class actions 
required subclasses for plaintiffs with different interests and that the 
settlement in Ortiz exhausted all of that defendant’s assets.125  
Ortiz severely limited the continuing viability of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
class actions in mass tort settlements.126 The decision required courts to 
carefully scrutinize class action settlements and to even more carefully 
consider potential conflicts of interest within the class.127 However, the 
requirements established by Ortiz also helped clarify the purpose of 
limited-fund class actions and identify situations in which these class 
actions might remain viable.128 The following Part describes how 
antitrust class actions could meet the Ortiz requirements for a limited-
fund class action and identifies three important advantages to treating 
antitrust class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).  
III.  LIMITED-FUND CLASS ACTIONS APPLIED TO ANTITRUST CLAIMS 
In antitrust direct- and indirect-purchaser class actions, it is the 
amount of the total overcharge to direct purchasers rather than the 
defendant’s total assets that limits damages.129 While the overcharge 
method of determining antitrust damages inevitably understates the true 
harm of price-fixing, the overcharge method provides an easy-to-
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 838–39, 841 (discussing the characteristics of previous limited-fund actions, 
which had formed the basis of the Advisory Committee’s experience with limited-fund class 
actions).  
 123. Id. at 856–57. 
 124. Id. at 859. The Court did not decide whether the fact that Fibreboard retained some of 
its value sufficed to deny certification. Id. However, the Court appeared particularly concerned 
that tortfeasors could bargain their way out of substantial liability and force tort victims to 
litigate their claims in complex arbitration proceedings and subject them to total caps without 
the possibility of punitive damages. Id. at 859–60. 
 125. Id. at 864–65. The Court did not ultimately accept the argument that the possibility of 
Fibreboard losing a pending appeal against its insurers, which would have left Fibreboard 
unable to meet its tort obligations, was a substantial risk of a limited fund. See id. at 871–73 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 126. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 108, § 22.73, at 421 (“Ortiz put in 
doubt the viability of limited-fund class actions in mass tort cases.”). 
 127. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864 (“Assuming, arguendo, that a mandatory, limited fund rationale 
could under some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort claimants, it would be 
essential . . . under Rules 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) that the class include all those with claims 
unsatisfied at the time of the settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by 
recognizing independently represented subclasses.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1301, 1312–14, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 
2012) (discussing the res judicata effects of a mass tort settlement class action).  
 129. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Basso & Ross, supra note 2, at 
897.  
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understand metric for establishing damages, which courts have 
generally assumed to be the correct measure.130 Thus, an antitrust claim 
meets Ortiz’s first requirement—a fund with an ascertainable limit131—
where a court finds that a method, usually total overcharge, exists for 
estimating the total damages purchasers have suffered.132 The total 
overcharge is clearly insufficient to meet the claims of all the direct and 
indirect purchasers who are each suing for the total overcharge; direct 
purchasers can argue that they absorbed the entire overcharge while 
indirect purchasers can argue that direct purchasers passed on the entire 
overcharge.133 An antitrust claim will also meet the second requirement 
of Ortiz—common theory of liability134—where the direct and indirect 
purchasers’ counsel coordinate to allege a common theory or theories of 
competitive harm. The last requirement of Otiz—pro rata 
distribution135—will require an equitable remedy and may provide a 
more efficient way to distribute damages to purchasers.136 
Litigating antitrust class actions as limited-fund class actions 
presents three distinct advantages: (1) it eliminates duplicative litigation 
and reduces the risk of duplicative recovery; (2) it improves 
enforcement by aligning plaintiffs’ incentives to litigate at the liability 
stage and seeks the maximum recovery by creating greater unity within 
the class; and (3) it simplifies damages calculations between levels of 
the supply chain by distributing damages according to a pro rata 
scheme. The following Sections discuss each of these advantages in 
turn.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 130. For a discussion of the issues around computing damages and the problems with 
assuming that overcharge damages are a correct measure of harm to retailers and consumers, see 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 68–76.  
 131. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841.  
 132. Federal courts have previously certified limited-fund classes in situations where 
damages were limited by statute or regulation. See, e.g., In re Black Farmers Discrimination 
Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (certifying a class of black farmers based on the 
existence of a limited fund for damages established by Congress to encourage settlement); Stott 
v. Capital Fin. Servs., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 316, 336, 347 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (certifying a limited fund 
based on a determination that defendant had to retain certain minimum amounts of capital in 
order to comply with securities regulations). But see In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 140 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (refusing to certify a class of smokers based on constitutional caps on punitive 
damages because any such cap was too speculative). 
 133. This sort of inherent conflict between the parties regarding the appropriate division of 
a limited recovery forms the core of a limited-fund class action. See supra notes 91–114 and 
accompanying text.  
 134. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841.  
 135. Id.  
 136. See infra Section III.C. 
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A.  Eliminate Duplicative Litigation 
Perhaps the most obvious and easily understood advantage to 
consolidating litigation is the savings that result from not duplicating 
many issues related to the litigation.137 While CAFA has resulted in 
more indirect-purchaser litigation arriving in federal court where parties 
can consolidate it for pretrial matters, a significant amount of indirect-
purchaser litigation still remains in state courts.138 Additionally, CAFA 
applies only to class actions and not to lawsuits by large numbers of 
indirect purchasers proceeding independently,139 whereas limited-fund 
class actions stay all other pending litigation.140 Finally, the MDL 
procedure only consolidates litigation for pretrial matters, not for the 
actual litigation.141 Limited-fund class actions consolidate all pending 
litigation by class members to determine liability and distribute 
funds.142 Reducing duplicative litigation will also improve enforcement 
by allowing the legal system to litigate more distinct cases rather than 
concentrating resources on a few cases. Additionally, litigating antitrust 
claims in a single forum will reduce the need to entertain various 
duplicative causes of action and legal theories targeting the same 
allegedly anticompetitive conduct.143 Although conflict-of-laws issues 
are important to the final disposition of claims, courts better handle 
                                                                                                                     
 137. For the wide variety of complex and resource-intensive issues that may arise in 
antitrust litigation, see generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 108, §§ 30–
30.4.  
 138. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 272 (approving of 
alternative methods to consolidate litigation such as MDL and the changes brought by CAFA 
but noting that ultimately these methods are insufficient). Two commissioners dissented from 
the Committee’s recommendation to provide indirect-purchasers standing and consolidate 
litigation in a single forum in part because they believed CAFA would substantially ameliorate 
the problem of indirect-purchaser litigation. Id. at 270. See also Robert H. Lande, New Options 
for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 
ALA. L. REV. 447, 448–49 & n.11 (2010) [hereinafter Lande, New Options] (noting the billions 
of dollars recovered in state indirect-purchaser litigation, including recent settlements in vitamin 
litigation).  
 139. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 272. 
 140. Courts have the authority to stay ongoing litigation under the All-Writs Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress 
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable 
to the usages and principles of law.”). For an example of a court exercising its authority to stay 
ongoing arbitration in a limited-fund context, see Stott v. Capital Fin. Servs., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 
316, 347 (N.D. Tex. 2011). 
 141. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998) 
(barring MDL courts from “self-assigning” venue for the purpose of trial). 
 142. See supra notes 87–112 and accompanying text. 
 143. For a discussion of choice-of-law issues in MDL, see INDIRECT PURCHASER 
LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 83–92 (noting variations in “damage and remedy 
provisions; whether the pass-on defense is recognized; whether the state’s law applies only to 
predominately intrastate activity; different statutes of limitations and standing provisions; and 
whether the state law protects defendants against multiple liability to direct and indirect 
purchasers” (footnotes omitted)).  
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 26
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/26
2015] RECONSIDERING INDIRECT-PURCHASER CLASS ACTIONS 935 
 
 
 
them through subclasses and procedural motions or hearings, and these 
claims rarely raise issues necessitating separate trials.  
B.  Improved Enforcement 
Less intuitive, but also significant, is the importance of a single class 
action to increase the incentives for all the parties to the litigation, 
including the courts, to maximize their investment in the litigation.144 
The current multi-district and multi-jurisdictional approach to litigating 
antitrust class actions limits the parties’ incentives to invest heavily in 
discovery, expert witnesses, and other litigation resources.145 Parties 
invest in litigation resources up to the point of negative marginal return 
on their investments—the point where investing additional time, money, 
and effort ceases to produce more benefits than costs.146 Litigation 
involving fewer claims will reach this point more quickly because the 
maximum potential recovery from resolving fewer claims is less than 
the maximum potential recovery from resolving more claims.147 This is 
true for all parties to the litigation. Plaintiffs in larger class actions have 
the potential for a larger recovery, but defendants also have the 
opportunity to defeat more claims, and judges have the possibility of 
adjudicating more claims.148 While alternative procedures like claim 
and issue preclusion attempt to provide similar incentives for both sides 
to invest heavily in litigation, they do not provide the same certainty as 
consolidated litigation; thus they make parties hesitant to invest more 
resources when the preclusive effects of a particular judgment are 
unknown.149  
Historically, private parties have constituted approximately 95% of 
antitrust plaintiffs,150 making private litigation essential to the current 
enforcement regime. One of the major criticisms of the rule of Illinois 
Brick is that it removed an entire class of potential antitrust enforcers 
and provided cartels with the ability to insulate themselves from 
liability by sharing their supracompetitive profits with direct 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action, supra note 106, at 848 (arguing that 
class action treatment provides economies of scale in litigation and encourages optimal 
investment).  
 145. Id. at 848–49. 
 146. Id. at 848.  
 147. Id. at 848–49.  
 148. Id. at 849, 851, 853 (describing the importance of optimal incentives for courts to 
reach the optimal investment in judicial resources). 
 149. Id. at 849.  
 150. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 58 & n.4. For the most recent statistics, see U.S. 
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Dec. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/december/
C02Dec13.pdf. 
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purchasers.151 Therefore, providing better incentives to litigate a variety 
of cases should produce better outcomes such as more accurate results 
and more comprehensive enforcement.  
C.  Pro Rata Distribution 
The Supreme Court has required pro rata distribution for Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) class actions.152 Professor Andrew I. Gavil has proposed a 
similar approach to indirect-purchaser damages based on a schedule of 
distribution.153 Using a pro rata scheme offers several benefits over 
calculating the amount of overcharge that direct purchasers passed on, a 
complex and often inconclusive inquiry.154 First, a pro rata system for 
allocating the overcharge would simplify the damages inquiry and 
eliminate the need to perform complex calculations of the amount of 
overcharge passed on.155 
Second, a pro rata system would preserve the incentives for all 
parties along the supply chain to sue because each purchaser would be 
sure to receive a portion of three times the total overcharge due to the 
Clayton Act’s treble damages provision.156 Without a pro rata system of 
recovery, direct purchasers, who likely have greater resources than 
indirect purchasers, might take advantage of the damage-allocation 
phase of litigation to claim a greater share of damages than they actually 
suffered. A pro rata scheme would ensure that all parties have the 
possibility of a significant recovery and eliminate the possibility of 
losing recovery to another group of purchasers.157  
Third, a pro rata scheme would ensure the unity of plaintiffs’ 
interests in pursuing maximum recovery from the defendant.158 In 
contrast, a scheme that awards damages in proportion to actual harm 
might facilitate free-rider problems because parties with weaker claims 
could wait until liability is proven in the first stage of litigation and then 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See Schinkel, Tuinstra & Rüggeberg, supra note 60, at 685 (discussing how “direct 
purchasers benefit with the cartel members at the expense of the rest of the chain of production 
and final consumers”). 
 152. See supra notes 115–128 and accompanying text.  
 153. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 195. Professor Robert H. Lande also 
discussed the merits of pro rata distribution, among other possible mechanisms, for distributing 
the overcharge among indirect purchasers. See Lande, New Options, supra note 138, at 475–84. 
The State of Nevada already authorizes pro rata distribution in parens patriae suits. NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 598A.160(2) (2013). 
 154. For a discussion of the many practical difficulties of proving pass-on, see Deng, 
Johnson & Leonard, supra note 30. Alternative methods for calculating damages other than 
focusing on the overcharge exist, e.g., the “yardstick” method and the “before-and-after” 
method. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 74. 
 155. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 195.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 196. 
 158. Id. 
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invest heavily in showing their own damages in the second stage.159 By 
establishing ex ante the percentage of any recovery for which a class of 
plaintiffs will be eligible, pro rata recovery unites plaintiffs’ interests in 
pursuing the maximum possible recovery. Pro rata recovery ensures that 
each party to the litigation will benefit from prevailing on the issue of 
liability or increasing the total amount of liability.160 However, a 
protracted damages inquiry would needlessly delay final recovery in a 
situation where litigation has likely already dragged on over a 
considerable period of time.161  
Fourth, a pro rata scheme would facilitate negotiations by 
clarifying the rights of the various plaintiff classes to the total 
overcharge.162 Plaintiffs would bargain in the shadow of an 
established remedial scheme and without inherent intra-class 
conflict.163 Settlement in the context of mass tort class actions has 
often fallen apart because of the adverse interests of different 
subclasses of plaintiffs.164 An ex ante scheme for distributing 
overcharge damages would solve this problem and make settlement 
more feasible.165  
Finally, a pro rata scheme would facilitate class certification and 
simplify conflicts within the class.166 While CAFA has facilitated the 
removal of indirect-purchaser litigation to federal court, federal courts 
have often refused to certify such class actions because the courts find 
that individual issues, such as the amount of overcharge passed on, tend 
to predominate.167 Limited-fund class actions do not have the same 
predominance requirement because of their focus on litigating the 
liability issue and eliminating complex individual issues related to 
                                                                                                                     
 159. Rosenberg, Regulatory Advantage, supra note 11, at 263. This free-rider problem 
mirrors many of the current difficulties facing class actions in general. By litigating 
individually, parties lose the potential benefits of pooled resources, and they drive up litigation 
costs by needlessly duplicating their efforts. See id. at 263–65. 
 160. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 196. 
 161. See Lande, New Options, supra note 138, at 458 n.52 (noting that some evidence 
suggests the average cartel lasts seven to eight years and litigation requires another four to five 
years).  
 162. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 196 (discussing additional benefits of 
pro rata distribution for settlement negotiation between different purchaser levels). 
 163. Id.  
 164. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–65 (1999) (refusing to certify a 
settlement class action in part because parties with adverse interests were not represented during 
negotiations).  
 165. Courts would still limit the plaintiffs participating in the negotiations as indirect 
purchasers to those from jurisdictions that grant such purchasers standing to sue.  
 166. Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 196. 
 167. Lopatka & Page, supra note 5, at 535 (noting that individual issues tend to 
predominate in indirect-purchaser litigation and that these suits rarely offer indirect purchasers 
much in the way of meaningful compensation).  
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calculating actual damages.168 By determining proper distribution ex 
ante, the courts can focus their efforts on issues of procedural law, the 
defendant’s liability, and the amount of the overcharge, and thereby 
reduce the amount of resources wasted on subjective determinations of 
predominance and common proof, which, unfortunately, often 
overwhelm class action litigation.169  
CONCLUSION 
This Note began with the observation that antitrust violations affect 
every one of us.170 From this observation flow two conclusions: (1) 
antitrust enforcement will never compensate all of the victims of 
competitive harm, and (2) collective-action problems will always 
undermine enforcement because no individual plaintiff is likely to suffer 
the full force of antitrust injury so that some amount of procedural 
intervention will be necessary to ensure robust enforcement.171 This 
Note’s approach attempts to limit these two difficulties by aligning the 
interests of the victims of anticompetitive behavior and empowering 
them to pursue their claims as a unified class. While this approach 
sacrifices some litigant autonomy and disavows any claims to actual 
compensation, it could significantly strengthen enforcement capabilities 
and eliminate duplicative litigation. It is unclear whether federal courts 
are willing to consolidate antitrust litigation in a single forum, 
especially when it means preempting ongoing state litigation.172 The 
MDL procedure, however, offers an intriguing model. This Note 
suggests adapting existing procedures—Rule 23(b)(1)(B)—to meet the 
changing needs of modern class-action litigation. Private enforcement to 
achieve public policy goals has long been an essential component of the 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See supra notes 91–114 and accompanying text.  
 169. See Gavil, Proposal for Reform, supra note 27, at 196 (noting the perverse incentives 
for plaintiffs’ lawyers to file multiple claims across multiple jurisdictions and for defense 
lawyers to exploit fears of pass-on to demand even greater requirements before certification); 
see also Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action, supra note 106, at 851–52 (noting the 
free-rider incentives for courts to rely on precedent, stare decisis, estoppel, and incorporation by 
reference to avoid meaningful engagement and analysis of the issues presented in complex 
litigation). 
 170. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 171. Alternatively, public entities such as state attorneys general, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, or the Federal Trade Commission could have the exclusive or primary power to sue. For 
a variety of reasons, enforcement in the United States has relied heavily on private parties and 
resisted providing broad power and resources to government enforcers. See generally FARHANG, 
supra note 88, at 16 (arguing “that legislative-executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy 
drives Congress to rely upon litigants and courts as an alternative to administrative power”). 
 172. Most state antitrust litigation is based largely and explicitly on federal precedents. See 
Davis, supra note 21, at 375–79 (discussing examples of state law based on federal precedents 
but differing on issues of indirect-purchaser standing). Therefore, federalism concerns—taking 
authority away from state lawmakers and courts—seem relatively minor because almost all the 
states have expressed little interest in developing unique antitrust rules, except, ironically, when 
it comes to the issue of indirect-purchaser causes of action. Id. 
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American legal system. Future reform should focus on building on 
existing structures to better meet public policy goals. 
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